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Promoting Transparency and Effectively Fighting
International Money Laundering
Antoine Cousin and Jean Albert*
Abstract
Offshore Financial Centers (OFCs, often referred to as "tax havens") play
a critical role in international money laundering and fraudulent financial
activities. While favorable tax practices are not objectionable in a
competitive world, the combination of these regimes with corporate and
regulatory devices that allow for investor anonymity and non traceability
of assets and capital unavoidably leads to the sheltering of criminally
tainted money. A nation's decision to implement such a regime cannot be
accidental. The recent OECD-led attacks on so-called "non-cooperative"
OFCs have thus been justified, although not free of ambiguities and only
partially effective. This article attempts to identify these ambiguities and
formulate a viable strategy to tackle this issue more forcefully.
Introduction
"The future of offshore will be marked by a collective attack by the OECD
and other high tax countries, and the resistance to this attack by both offshore countries
and onshore tax payers." 1
To some extent the developed world has already engaged in such an
attack.2 Most noticeably, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)
3, an "inter-governmental body whose purpose is the development and promotion
of

* Antoine Cousin is an Associate in the New York office of an international law firm. Master's in
Economics & Finance, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (1999), J.D., Paris University (1997). Jean
Albert is an attorney in New York. He specializes in cross-border transactions and negotiations. LL.M.
(1998) and J.S.D. candidate, Yale Law School. LL.M, Paris University (1996). The authors wish to thank
Joost Pauwelyn, Benjamin Kanovitch and David Hananel for their many useful comments and suggestions.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the
institutions to which they are affiliated.
1BARRY SPITZ, INTERNATIONAL TAx HAVENS GUIDE: THE PROFESSIONAL'S SOURCE FOR OFFSHORE
INVESTMENT INFORMATION (Harcourt, 2000).
2 FATF Secretariat, OECD, FinancialAction Task Force on Money Laundering: Annual Report 20002001, FATF at http://www I.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/AR200 len.pdf. (A list of worldwide anti-money laundering
initiatives).
3See id. The twenty-nine FATF member countries and governments are: Argentina; Australia; Austria;
Belgium; Brazil; Canada; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hong Kong, China; Iceland;
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policies, both at national and international levels, to combat money laundering", has
played an instrumental role since 1989 in building cooperation among the G-7 and OECD
countries in the fight against money laundering and "problematic" Offshore Financial
Centers (OFCs).4 The FATF is a policy-making body working towards the adoption by
all countries of a set of forty recommendations designed to help combat money
laundering, and applying a range of countermeasures to the so-called "non-cooperative"
OFCs. However, while heading in the right direction and requiring substantial effort, the
FATF approach seems far from sufficient in that it lacks implementation tools and
remains too heavily based upon the goodwill of OFCs' governments, financial
institutions and law enforcement bodies.
Furthermore, one should not overlook that the anti-money laundering
endeavor also serves as a tool for the developed world to try and thwart international tax
competition, as it is at least equally concerned about potential "losses of tax revenues
onshore" as it is with international crime.5 Also, by stigmatizing "offshore countries",
the industrialized world (to which we will indistinctly refer as "the OECD countries")
fails to recognize its own many faults in terms of the6 legalization, use and protection of
OFCs and its own domestic low tax financial centers.
This article seeks to clarify the issues pertaining to the definition and
existence of OFCs and explain why international crime and tax competition should be
regarded as separate issues. It considers the ambiguous position of the OECD countries
with respect to OFCs and affirms that the OECD countries yield somewhat equivocal
arguments and may appear to have a weak case against OFCs (Part I). It contends,
however, that OFCs - through their deliberately poor regulatory oversight of financial
activities and legislative devices allowing for the sheltering of criminally tainted money pose a considerable threat to both the developed and developing worlds. It asserts that it
is incumbent upon all countries, as well as in their best interest, to act against them as
early and effectively as possible. To that end, it aims to assess the most relevant recent
anti-money laundering initiatives and formulate a viable strategy to more forcefully
address the issue of problematic OFCs and money laundering (Part II).
Ireland; Italy; Japan; Luxembourg; Mexico; the Kingdom of the Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway;
Portugal; Singapore; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Turkey; the United Kingdom; and the United States.
4 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, About the FATF andlts
Work, FATF (Feb. 4, 2002),
at http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf.
5"The Interim Committee, together with the FSF and the G7, have expressed concerns about offshore
finance and offshore financial centers. These reflect anxieties about ineffective financial supervision, strict
bank and corporate secrecy rules that hinder investigation, arrangements that facilitate money laundering
and other financial crimes, and loss of tax revenues onshore." IMF, Offshore FinancialCenters - The Role
of the IMF. International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department (June 23, 2000), at

http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/mae/oshore/2000/eng/role.htm (at 1.5.)
6In this document, references to "countries" or "nations" should be taken to apply equally to "territories" or
"jurisdictions".
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I.

OECD countries vs. OFCs: an ambiguous relationship and a weak case?
A. Background on OFCs.

Quantifying assets accumulated in OFCs is hard, if not impossible. The
IMF, on the basis of data provided by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), finds
that "for selected OFCs, on balance sheet cross-border assets reached a level of
U.S.$4,600 billion at end-June 1999 (about 50 percent of total cross-border assets), of
which U.S.$900 billion in the Caribbean, U.S.$1,000 billion in Asia, and most of the
remaining U.S.$2,700 billion [is] accounted for by the International Financial Centers,
namely London, the U.S. International Banking Facilities (IBFs) and the Japanese
Offshore Market (JOM). ' 7 However, the smaller OFCs (for instance, Bermuda, Liberia,
Panama, etc.) "do not report for BIS purposes, but claims on the non-reporting OFCs are
growing, whereas claims on the reporting OFCs are declining". 8 As for money
laundering and the amounts of "dirty money" placed into the world's financial systems
each year, estimates are equally difficult but these amounts are thought to be in the range
of U.S.$500 billion to $U.S.800 billion, or 2 to 5 % of the world's annual GDP.9 The
number of banks located in OFCs is estimated to be in excess of 4,000 (this figure does
not include non-bank financial institutions, nor does it begin to encompass the myriad
OFCs-based firms providing financial, tax-planning, investment, corporate and trust
services).
As far as the definition of OFCs is concerned, the IMF considers that
OFCs have five core features: (i) financial institutions carrying-out business primarily
with non-residents, (ii) financial systems with external assets and liabilities out of
proportion to domestic financial intermediation designed to finance domestic economies,
(iii) low or zero taxation, (iv) moderate or light financial regulation and (v) banking
secrecy and anonymity. 10 We prefer the following definition: (i) favorable fiscal policy,
7 IMF, BackgroundPaper,International

Monetary Fund, Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department
(June 23, 2000), at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/mae/oshore/2000/eng/back.htm (at II.B.)

8SeeId.
9 Michel Camdessus, the former International Monetary Fund managing director, had estimated that "the
volume of worldwide money laundering is between 2 and 5 percent of the world's gross domestic product some $600,000 million even at the low end of the range." See, The Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering, Economic Perspectives,ELECTR. J. U.S. DEP'T ST., Vol. 6, No. 2 (May 2001), at
http://usinfo.state.gov/joumals/ites/0501/ijee/stateI.htm
'0See Offshore Financial Centers - The Role of the IMF, supra,note 5 (at 1.3): "Amongst the many
definitions of Offshore Financial Centers (OFCs), perhaps the most practical characterizes OFCs as centers
where the bulk of financial sector transactions on both sides of the balance sheet are with individuals or
companies that are not residents of OFCs, where the transactions are initiated elsewhere, and where the
majority of the institutions involved are controlled by non-residents. Thus many OFCs have the following
characteristics: jurisdictions that have financial institutions engaged primarily in business with nonresidents; financial systems with external assets and liabilities out of proportion to domestic financial
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(ii) poor regulatory oversight and purposely limited controls on financial activities and
(iii) secrecy pertaining to real and beneficial ownership of assets designed to attract
foreign assets resulting in high volumes of financial transactions initiated directly or
indirectly by non-residents and (iv) disproportionate relationship between the volumes of
financial transactions and the output of the local economy. Our definition thus relies
more on causality and places the emphasis on opacity and weaknesses of regulatory
practices. It is in our view more appropriate because it allows deductive dissection and
provides for a better understanding as to why money is laundered through OFCs and how
this could be avoided. By acting on points (ii) and (iii) OFCs would be able to cope with
the money-laundering problem whilst remaining competitive to attract foreign assets. We
believe that the opacity resulting from legislation permitting full secrecy on, prohibiting
disclosure of, corporate, bank account and securities ownership information (among other
things) invariably leads to the sheltering of criminally tainted money. Opacity constitutes
the link between OFCs and criminal activities. Low or nonexistent taxation might be
sufficient to characterize "tax havens", but our focus here is on the OFCs that chose to
not exercise regulatory oversight of business activities and welcome assets and capitals
without concern for their origin or the purpose for which they might be used, and also
aim to obfuscate information relating to such assets. In short, while we think that a lowor no-tax regime is not necessarily objectionable as such, the combination of such a
regime with corporate or legislative devices allowing for investor anonymity and nontraceability of assets and capitals makes it a heaven for international criminals. It should
further be noted than the harm done to developing countries by OFCs engaging in
"harmful tax practices" (i.e. inducing tax evasion), fraudulent financial activities and
money laundering is in fact more decisive than the harm done to industrialized nations, as
the rise of developing economies is directly conditioned upon better tax collection,
healthier public finances and lower corruption. OFCs also play an important role in
worsening the damage done to developing nations by economic crisis and currency and
markets turmoils." 1
intermediation designed to finance domestic economies; and more popularly, centers which provide some
or all of the following opportunities: low or zero taxation; moderate or light financial regulation; banking
secrecy and anonymity."
11See Id.(at II.A. 15.): "Offshore banking operations have, however, played a role in the recent financial
crises of Latin America and Asia. In Latin America, offshore establishments were used as alternatives to

domestic financial institutions that were often subject to strict prudential regulations and high reserve
requirements. Moreover, tax advantages as well as political and economic uncertainty onshore fueled the
use of offshore establishments. The absence of effective consolidated supervision by onshore supervisors
proved to be the most important factor in permitting the exploitation of regulatory arbitrage offered in some

OFCs through the transfer of assets and liabilities between offshore establishments and parent banks
onshore. In Asia (for example in Thailand), regulatory and fiscal advantages as well as lower borrowing

costs, offered in some OFCs induced many Asian banks and corporations to tap international capital
markets through offshore establishments ...
Large, undetected, and poorly accounted for offshore funds
contributed to credit expansion in the region, led to increasing exposures to liquidity, foreign exchange, and

credit risks, and had systemic effects on the financial systems of individual countries concerned."
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B. OECD countries vs. OFCs: ambiguities and weaknesses.
1.

Internal and external promotion of OFCs by the OECD countries.

A comprehensive overview of the legal mechanisms whereby the OECD
countries have acknowledged and promoted the use of OFCs would far exceed the scope
of this article. We will only briefly mention the U.S. Foreign Sales Corporations (FSCs)
mechanism and the subsequent regulatory devices adopted by the United States that
directly or indirectly rely on OFCs.
The FSCs mechanism gained attention when the E.U. filed a complaint
with the WTO with respect to it in September 1998. The WTO ruled against the U.S. on
March 20, 2000. On August 20, 2001, a WTO panel held that the FSC Replacement Act
introducing the Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act (ETI) and enacted by the U.S. on
November 15, 2000 to comply with the previous WTO ruling on FSCs (i) constitutes a
prohibited export subsidy (ii) violates the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and (iii)
discriminates in favor of U.S. goods. The WTO panel also concluded that the U.S.
breached its WTO obligations by maintaining the FSC scheme in force beyond
November 1, 2000.
The FSC rules allowed a tax exemption to U.S. companies for a portion of
the trade income derived from their qualifying foreign subsidiaries. Such portion could
be repatriated as a tax-free dividend by the U.S. parent corporation. 12 A U.S. company
could benefit from the regime if it had a foreign presence, respected specific control
conditions over the subsidiary and had products designated as exports that were partly
American made. In effect, the U.S. created a tax loophole purposely. 3 All a U.S.
company had to do was create a subsidiary in a tax haven and have all financial
transactions linked to the export of its products go through that de-taxed subsidiary.
The ETI exclusion or loophole was enacted by the U.S. in November 2000
to replace the U.S. foreign sales corporations (FSC) regime, which had been found by the
14
World Trade Organization (WTO) to be an illegal export subsidy in violation of GATT.
12I.R.C.

§§ 921-927 (2001).
These exceptions to the U.S. worldwide taxing regime are not exceptional. 26 U.S.C. § 91 l(b)(2)(D)
(1994) allows deductions on foreign earned income for U.S. citizens. 26 U.S.C. § 936 (Supp. 1996)
essentially exempts from all taxation US corporations operating in U.S. possessions. Cf. Raymond Wacker
& Mitchell Weiss, Restrictions to the Section 936 Credit Imposed by the Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1993,20 INT'L TAX J. 24 (1994). 26 U.S.C. §§ 951-60 (1994) shows that even the Controlled Foreign
Corporation regime contains substantial loopholes.
14 Had the U.S. had a strong case against the E.U. with respect to the E.U.'s tax regime, which it claimed
justified its adoption of the FSC mechanism, it could have challenged it before the WTO. See Robert
Goulder, US. Will Comply With WTO Ruling on FSC, But Details Remain Unclear,2000 TNT 70-3 (April
10, 2000) (quoting Rita Hayes, the then U.S. Trade Ambassador, comment that "it is the intention of the
13
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The main difference between the two regimes is that the ETI exclusion is broader and
does not even require that a foreign subsidiary exist. Its focus is on exports rather than on
export procedures.
OFCs have prospered tremendously under both regimes. Under the FSC
regime, U.S. companies set up subsidiaries in tax havens to benefit from the clement tax
framework. Since the tax havens would not tax the profits from the sales of the products,
profits from exports would be virtually tax-free for U.S. companies. Even if it became
unnecessary, under ETI, U.S. companies kept their subsidiaries in tax havens for various
other purposes. Debts and profits could be easily transferred to these subsidiaries with no
fiscal consequence. Enron was one of many U.S. companies that learned to creatively
use all the advantages provided by OFCs during the FSC period. Further, given that the
ETI exclusion does not require subsidiaries in tax havens to benefit from export
exemptions, these offshore centers may also be used to exempt what would otherwise not
qualify as an export. OFCs also make it easier for less scrupulous management to forget
portions of profits. Finally, the opacity created by the use of OFCs defies the purpose of
the U.S. legislation on disclosure of information for publicly traded companies.
It is fair to conclude that mechanisms such as the ETI and the FSC
regimes have greatly contributed to the dramatic growth of OFCs over the last twenty
years, given the amounts placed in OFCs by U.S. companies taking advantage of those
regimes - and this had most frequently occurred in the course of perfectly legitimate
businesses.
2.

International tax competition and competitive advantage.

While it is perfectly legitimate for the OECD countries to severely punish
tax evasion, the attractive taxation offered by OFCs may not provide such an easy basis
for criticism. The United States has acknowledged the advantages of attractive taxation
for international fiscal competition, and legitimized the use of friendly or affiliated
territories such as the Bahamas for tax purposes. Certain U.S. states such as Delaware
have relied on taxation as much as attractive corporate laws to attract business, capitals
and assets. In the European Union, where harmonization of tax policies is deemed to be a
critical aspect of the Union's economic integration, there currently is a substantial degree
of criticism among member countries with respect to "unfair tax competition". Countries
such as Luxembourg the Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, the United Kingdom and
Austria have been most noticeably singled out, whether as a result of certain provisions in
their internal tax frameworks or those of their "affiliated", "protected", "dependent"
United States to implement the recommendations and rulings of the [Settlement Body] in a manner that
respects our WTO obligations [but that is also] consistent with our goal of ensuring that U.S. exporters are

not placed at a disadvantage in relation to their foreign competitors.")
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territories and historical partners (such as the Netherlands Antilles, British Virgin Islands,
Aruba, Bermuda, Monaco, Jersey, Guernsey' 5 , Isle of Man, Madeira and the Turks &
Caicos Islands). Therefore, the OECD countries may be said to have significantly
weakened the rationale for possible future recourses against OFCs on the sole ground of
"harmful tax competition". Or is international fiscal competition only harmful when it
profits a group of otherwise powerless islands? With trillions of dollars leaving the
shores of the developed world , the OECD countries are now left with no choice but to
compete with OFCs, which means creating incentives to keep companies and individuals
from using them. OECD countries have at their disposal an arsenal of possible measures
to attain that goal. Some of these are: (i) creating OFCs structures within their borders,
(ii) discrediting OFCs by associating them with international crime, (iii) adopting more
stringent anti-tax evasion rules, (iv) coercing OFCs' cooperation, (v) prohibiting all
transactions with OFCs. OECD countries seem to have so far chosen all five routes
without actually focusing on any one of them.
Further, the OECD countries make the case for international liberalization
of trade by arguing that it benefits all participants, following the "competitive advantage"
theory. As a result, "competitiveness has become one of the central preoccupations of
government and industry." 7 The wealth of a nation is strongly associated with its ability
to be competitive in specific areas, and competitiveness is often the result of
government's policy and influence. 18 OFCs are no less than other countries in the race to
acquire wealth. They have chosen tax policy as a means to influence specific industries
and to hedge on other countries' tax regimes. In essence, if it is acceptable and even
desirable for the greater good of international trade that the OECD nationals use the
cheap and available labor provided by emerging economies such as Pakistan or Indonesia
(who themselves use this labor force to their own competitive advantage so as to integrate
15 Britain is responsible for the external affairs of Jersey and Guernsey, in particular their "exclusion from
the policy of harmonizing taxation within member states." See, Barry Spitz, supra note 1.
16 The OECD report entitled Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue "indicates that in 1994
the G7 countries invested over US$200 billion in various Caribbean and South Pacific Islands - a more
while traditional tax havens only
than 500 percent increase over the aggregate amount invested in 1985 ...
account for 1.2 of the world's population, and, only three percent of the world's GDP, they account for 26
percent of U.S. multinationals' assets and 31 percent of their net profits. That the international tax base is
eroding thus seems clear, lest there would be little need to invest such large amounts in these small
islands." Mitchell B. Weiss, InternationalTax Competition: An Efficient or Inefficient Phenomenon?, 16
AKRON TAx J. 99 (2001). See, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Harmful Tax
Competition: an Emerging GlobalIssue (1998), at
http://wwwl.oecd.org/daf/fa/harmtax/harmfultaxeng.pdf

17 MICHAEL

E. PORTER,

THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 1 (Free

Press, 1998).

8

p. 126 ("Many see it [Government] as a vital, if not the most important, influence on modern
8See id.
international competition. Government policy in Japan and Korea is particularly associated with the
success these nations' firms have enjoyed.") See also, id. p. 269 ("The large US foreign aid program
undoubtedly helped as well.").
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in world trade and eventually develop more advanced skills) it is equally acceptable19that
remote Caribbean territories attract capital inflows by means of competitive taxation.
Globalization has undoubtedly intensified international tax competition
and, as is so often the case, those who are on the losing side attempt to impede its
progress. The OECD is no exception. As earlier noted, it is at least equally concerned
about potential losses of tax revenues onshore as it is with international crime. This has
led it to adopt on April 9, 1998, a report entitled "Harmful Tax Competition: An
Emerging Global Issue"2 , which clearly suggests that OFCs' tax regimes pose a threat to
the OECD that needs to be eradicated. It also evidently draws no distinction between fair
tax competition and financial crime. It assigns the blame to "tax havens" but appears
much less critical toward tax dumping and tax-free zones within the OECD. In short, one
should infer from the OECD findings that OFCs engage in a reckless and virtually
criminal fiscal race to the bottom whereas the OECD countries want nothing more than a
fair and level playing field.
More realistically, the OECD countries have found fierce adversaries in
the world of economic competitiveness. The extent to which OFCs' reduce the tax
revenues of the developed and developing countries, however, remains unclear. The
report argues that "preferential tax regimes" are eroding the member states' tax bases and
are thus "reducing the taxes
that would otherwise be payable to them." There is some
2
evidence to the contrary. 1
Further, while the OECD rightfully makes the point that the amounts
accumulated in OFCs are far disproportionate to their population sizes and real economic
19"That there are now so many tax havens on earth is a direct consequence of the promotion of flexibility
and deregulation in all economic activities made by the OECD for decades ...
the OECD pretends that low
taxes, flexibility and competition are the panacea for all economic situations. The organization has also
been claiming that all markets should be deregulated, and that free competition promotes universal welfare
...
Now these very same principles are supposed to be illegitimate for the small countries that profit from
financial globalization." Frangois Chesnais (Professor of Financial Economics at Villetaneuse University,
France). Quoted in Godoy, Julio, Offshore FinancialCenters Continueto Resist OECD Pressure,IPS,
(Mar. 4, 2001), at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/offshore.htm
20
See supra,note 16.
21 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization,Tax Competition and the FiscalCrisisof the Welfare State,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1586 (2000). ("There is no evidence that overall revenue from the personal or
corporate income tax in OECD member countries has declined either as a percent of GDP or of total tax
revenue from 1965 to 1995."), See also, A Survey of Globalisationand Tax, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 29,
2000, at 17 ("In most developed countries tax revenues as a proportion of GDP have in fact risen over the
past 30 years, and the share of taxes on corporate profits in overall tax revenues has remained much the
same."). See also Vito Tanzi, The Nature and Effects of Globalizationon InternationalTax Policy.
Globalizatior TechnologicalDevelopments, and the Work of FiscalTermites, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1261

(2001). But, see supra,note 16.
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22
importance , it fails to acknowledge the striking disproportion between the enormous
wealth accumulated in the OECD member countries and their relatively small weight in
the world population.

OECD countries are also ill equipped for international tax competition,
which is likely to intensify significantly with or without OFCs. In addition, the very
concepts of "harmful" or "unfair tax practices" do not necessarily have substantial
theoretical and economic grounds (for instance, many international taxation experts have
somewhat provocatively noted that the difference in total tax pressure between Sweden
and the United States is roughly equivalent to the "spread" existing between the total tax
pressure in the U.S. and in certain OFCs, thereby making the case that there is no such
thing as an economic "standard" for tax pressure). 3
The capital export neutrality theory (CEN) is often used in arguing that
international tax competition is inefficient. 24 This theory's premise, however, is not
based on efficient allocation of world resources but on the inefficiency of the allocation
from the perspective of the country of initial income. In fact, the theory is primarily
relevant to argue that there exists today no conceptual analysis of what would be an
efficient allocation of the world's resources as a result of globalization. The assumption
is still that an efficient allocation of world resources is the sum of an efficient allocation
of each states' resources within themselves. These traditional theories seem both
outdated and inapplicable in a world without barriers and where free international trade is
promoted. There will be discrepancies and arbitrages and in the end the free flow of
capital and people will define the efficiency of the allocation of world resources. The
OECD is less concerned by inefficiencies than it is with preserving its member states' tax
OECD countries favor
bases and the allocation of the world's resources as it is.
international trade. They are eager not to share the world's resources with developing
countries but to create more resources and riches so that their increased wealth benefits
not only them but the developing world also. OFCs and international tax competition do
not achieve that. They take resources away from the developed world and place these
resources in the hands of corporations and "rogue" states that may not share the view that
the richest states of the world should remain richer or for that matter that they represent
the will of the "world population".

22

See supra,note 16.

23

See, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, supra,note 2 1.

24

Michael P. Devereux & Mark Pearson, European Tax Harmonizationand ProductionEfficiency, 39 EUR.

ECON. REv. 1657, 1660 (1995).
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3.

Existence of grounds for action against problematic OFCs.

A key element in the debate over OFCs is whether the OECD countries
have grounds for action against the problematic, so-called "non-cooperative" OFCs.
OFCs usually have not violated any bilateral or multilateral agreements on
trade or otherwise by virtue of their adoption of corporate devices and regulatory
frameworks making money laundering less difficult than in other jurisdictions.
However, this does not mean that problematic OFCs have no obligations
under international law in respect of money laundering nor that they have not violated
those obligations. All countries may well have an obligation to fight against international
crime. This obligation may be deemed to have been created by consensus and to have
become customary international law, which would mean that the fight against
international crime - in all its forms and including the laundering of its proceeds requires adherence. 25 In addition, if the fight against international crime has been so
widely acknowledged as necessary and legitimate that it has become an obligation under
international law, OFCs' pure national interests must yield to international public interest
and public order.
Accordingly, it must be determined whether such a consensus exists in
order to ascertain whether international law provides for an obligation to fight
international crime.
Consensus has traditionally been the mode of decision-taking in the
international economic and financial arena 26, and most countries have declared that they
oppose international crime and its corollary, money-laundering. If there is a consensus
that countries should not participate in international terrorism, crime, money laundering
and the likes - whether directly or indirectly - then this consensus creates an obligation
for every state not to participate in or promote such activities. In fact, many
organizations worldwide have recognized this obligation. The G7's "Actions Against
Abuse of the Global Financial System" provides for sanctions against countries that
25

Failure to precisely identify an international obligation may arise from various causes, such as: (i) the

international obligation is such and so obvious that it need not be identified expressly (such as compliance
with basic international public order requirements); (ii) there is no violation of an international obligation;
(iii) the international obligation that was violated has been determined but has not been expressly labeled as
such; (iv) there is no need to characterize the obligation as the imposition of sanctions is not contemplated;
(v) the sanctions that might be taken would lack effectiveness; and (vi) there is no need to determine the
international obligation that was violated since those bringing action are in fact a party, the legislator, the
judge, and the executor.
26 Benjamin R. Hartman, Coercing Cooperationfrom Offshore FinancialCenters: Identity
and
Coincidence of InternationalObligationsAgainst Money Launderingand Harmful Tax Competition, 24
B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 253 (Spring 2001).
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"demonstrate failure to meet certain standards and are not committed to enhancing their
level of compliance with international standards." 27 The United Nations, the IMF, the
Asian Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), the Caribbean Financial Action Task
Force (CFATF), the Council of Europe Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation
of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV Committee), the Organization of
American States (OAS), and CARICOM have all expressed their position against moneylaundering.28 The FATF, of course, issues recommendations and minimum standards of
compliance and aims at fostering consensus among its members, OFCs and third parties.
These organizations combined represent most of the world's countries.
One may thus conclude that there is a clear consensus on this issue and
that states have created for themselves an obligation to fight against money-laundering.
This obligation may be invoked as a rule of international law, because the two
fundamental requirements that the rule must be a general principle common to the major
legal systems of the world and not be inappropriate for international claims are satisfied.
It should be noted, though, that (i) no such consensus has been reached
with respect to international tax competition (which is another reason why it is critical to
distinguish between international money-laundering and tax issues) and (ii) the existence
of a state's obligation under international law does not necessarily provide other states
with a right to bring action in the event of a breach by this state of its obligation. 29 We
will discuss this issue in connection with our proposition that the OECD countries
eventually take repressive measures against problematic OFCs.
The arguments set out in this Part I suggest that the OECD countries
would have a rather weak case against OFCs if they were to narrowly focus on tax
competition for purposes of their fight against these jurisdictions. In addition, the OECD
countries' attitude toward low-tax jurisdictions would likely seem paradoxical if not
blatantly hypocritical in light of the very free-trade principles they most frequently
embrace. Yet, the proven involvement or leniency of OFCs toward international crime and the consequences of it on an international scale - makes it necessary and legitimate
to try and undermine them. Having said this, we need to identify more viable means to
thwart problematic OFCs. It is our view that the OECD countries will better succeed in
this difficult endeavor by making their fight a struggle against money laundering and
fraudulent financial activities rather than whining about OFCs' diverting a share of their
tax revenues. As indicated above, cracking down on OFCs on the ground of their willful
support of financial crime is (a) economically more relevant than attempting to impede
27

Actions Against Abuse of the Global Financial System, July 21, 2000, at

http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2000/pdfs/action.pdf (at 12).
28 CARICOM represents the Caribbean community. See http://www.caricom.org.
29
See discussion, infra, Part II.C.
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international tax competition, (b) both legally and practically feasible and (c) will
incidentally help address the issue of unfair tax competition to the benefit of the OECD
countries. While the obliteration of all problematic OFCs is probably not feasible, it is
certainly possible for the OECD countries to coerce a handful of them to become actual
partners and greatly destabilize the others.
II.

How to effectively fight problematic OFCs? Toward a more forceful approach.

We should first mention that while the existence of a myriad of OFCs
creates the illusion that it would not be unfeasible to thwart them, the fact that there are
so many of them provides the OECD countries with considerable leverage power.
Indeed, it results in harsh competition between OFCs, given investors' ability to quickly
relocate their assets to other jurisdictions offering comparable incentives. OFCs are
consequently wary of being publicly singled-out and labeled "non-cooperative". They
also dislike the prospect of facing sanctions from developed countries. Indeed, even
when the OECD countries have merely contemplated sanctions or mentioned possible
retaliatory measures against designated OFCs, apparently little more than rhetorical
threats with limited potential effects, the result has been significant losses of assets and
capital for the concerned OFCs. The OECD countries should always keep in mind this
leverage power when dealing with problematic OFCs and trying to obtain their
cooperation.
A.

Furthering anti-money laundering initiatives within the OECD countries.

If the developed world really intends to tackle the issue of international
money laundering and financial crime, it must naturally make an effort at home before
dealing with offshore jurisdictions. We can only briefly mention certain U.S. and E.U.
anti-money laundering initiatives in this article, but it is important to note that the two
economic superpowers have recently taken bold domestic steps against money
laundering. The extent of the current U.S. administration's support for concerted
multilateral anti-money laundering approaches, however, remains unclear.
The E.U.'s anti-money laundering framework is arguably more inclusive
than its U.S. counterpart, and recent European initiatives in this regard are likely to widen
that gap. As noted above, there is a substantial degree of criticism among E.U. members
currently with respect to "unfair tax competition" issues. That criticism frequently stems
from competing fiscal interests, intra-E.U. tax dumping and the existence of several
onshore or offshore low-tax or no-tax financial centers that are affiliated territories and
historical partners of a fair number of E.U. member countries. These tax policy issues,
however, are not exclusive of genuine concern over money laundering and financial
crime. Such concern has led to the adoption of very stringent anti-money laundering
regulations - starting most visibly with the adoption of the 1991 "Directive on prevention
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of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering"." (Many E.U.
members had in fact endowed themselves with comprehensive anti-money laundering
regulations before the enactment of the Directive and have since exceeded its
requirements.) 3 1 The scope of the Directive has recently been substantially widened.
The obligations it provides in terms of client identification, record keeping and reporting
of suspicious transactions have been extended to external accountants and auditors, real
estate agents, notaries, lawyers, 32 dealers in high value goods such as precious stones and
metals or works of art, auctioneers, transporters of funds and casinos (it previously
applied to financial institutions only).33 The Directive aims at combating laundering of
the "proceeds of all organized crime and fraud against the budget of the European Union
(EU)", whereas the previous version of the Directive imposed obligations only with
respect to the proceeds of drug-related crime. The extension of its coverage to several
non-financial activities and professions that are deemed vulnerable to misuse by money
launderers constitutes another obvious improvement. For instance, the Directive requires
banking secrecy to be suspended whenever necessary and that any suspicions of money
laundering be reported to the authorities. 34 It will be interesting to observe how the most
controversial European financial centers, such as Luxembourg, implement this directive
and whether the E.U. succeeds in having them amend their bank and financial secrecy
laws in the near future.
30

Directive on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering,

91/308/EEC.
31 France and Belgium, for instance, have been at the forefront of the anti-money laundering effort since the
early nineties and have adopted very stringent reporting obligations bearing on stock brokers, banks, public
financial institutions and money changers. See for instance the French "Loi n' 90-614 du 12juillet 1990
relative atlaparticipationdes organismesfinanciers b la lutte contre le blanchiment des capitaux
provenant du trafic des stupefiants." France has also created TRACFIN, an administrative body whose role
is to investigate and gather information relevant to money laundering activities in France. It is vested with
extensive powers for that purpose.
32 The exact extent of lawyers' obligations was undoubtedly one the most heatedly-debated
issues in the
negotiations surrounding the preparation of the new directive, as concerns about client confidentiality made
it a rather delicate matter. While it had always been clear that lawyers representing their clients in
contentious matters would not be subject to any reporting obligations, the conditions upon which they were
to report suspicion of clients being engaged in money laundering (or attempted money laundering) while
providing advisory services were extensively discussed. It was eventually decided that the Directive would
only require lawyers to report money laundering activities of which they have "knowledge" and that
member states would be free to adopt more stringent requirements in this regard.
33 Proposal for a Parliament and Council Directive amending Council Directive on Prevention of the Use of
the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering (91/308/EEC), adopted in Parliament's plenary
session in Strasbourg on November 13, 2001, and adopted by the European Union's Council of Ministers
on November 19, 2001, to enter into force in the Member states in eighteen months' time.
See, at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/124016.htm
34
See, GROUPE D'ACTION FINANCIERE SUR LE BLANCHIMENT DE CAPITAUX (GAFI), at
http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/TY1998 fr.pdf. See also, ECOFIN et JUSTICE, AFFAIRES
INTERIEURES et PROTECTION CIVILE, at http://ue.eu.int/Pressdata/fr/ecofm/ACF2B8C.pdf.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

13

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 2

The E.U. has very recently committed itself to the most demanding antimoney laundering international standards to date by adopting the so-called "Paris
declaration". 35 The representatives of all the member countries of the European Union,
minus Sweden and Finland, adopted the Paris declaration on February 8, 2002, which
comprises a number of recommendations that each signatory must ratify and translate
into domestic law. The Paris declaration provides for better harmonization of criminal
laws regarding anti-money laundering, mandatory reporting on a unified registry of
transactions involving offshore banking accounts and trusts of which real and beneficial
ownership is unclear and prohibits E.U. financial institutions and banks to set up
subsidiaries or a local presence in the OFCs designated as "non-cooperative" by the
FATF.36 It also provides for improved cooperation among the signatories' judicial
authorities and law enforcement bodies and for seizure and allocation of laundered assets
among the signatories. 37 The promoters of the declaration have, however, failed to
establish an anti-money laundering prosecution mechanism at the European level.
Prosecutorial powers will therefore remain vested in member states' judicial authorities.
One of the most interesting aspects of the declaration is that it contemplates a shift of the
burden of proof in litigation concerning money-laundering activities - which would result
in defendants suspected of having engaged in such activities having to demonstrate
otherwise. 38 In addition, certain member countries have decided to take additional
France, for instance, has
retaliation measures against "non-cooperative" OFCs.
public aid to those jurisdictions unless such
announced that it would consider suspending
39
aid is directly targeted at local populations.
Signatories of the Paris declaration will gather periodically to follow-up
on the implementation of these measures, which in some instances will not prove easy.
Many of the biggest European banks indeed already have subsidiaries in "noncooperative" jurisdictions such as Egypt, Russia or Israel. 40 The declaration also
provides reciprocally that these jurisdictions' banks will be precluded from setting up
subsidiaries and/or a local presence in the countries that are signatories to the declaration.
These requirements will undoubtedly require further adjustments.
As noted in this article, we believe that the fight against money laundering
should now revolve around enhancing transparency with respect to real and beneficial
ownership of assets and capitals located in OFCs and traceability of transactions
involving OFCs. The Paris declaration appears to be a most welcome development to
35 See, AGEFI, February 11, 2002, Vol. 29.
36

id

37 See, AGEFI, supraNote 35.
38

id.

39 Id.
40 id.
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that end. However, the fact that it has been signed only by European nations will
considerably limits its scope.
To a broader extent, it seems fair to assume that the most compelling
the
European Union will face in the upcoming years are (i) whether or not
issues that
intra-E.U. financial centers will comply with the E.U.'s stringent anti-money laundering
and transparency enhancing requirements and what will happen otherwise, (ii) whether or
not the support from certain E.U. members for their dependent and affiliated territories
will fade and (iii) whether intra-E.U. tax competitions issues eventually will be
distinguished from the broader problem of money laundering and financial crime.
The U.S. regulations with respect to money laundering 4 1 have recently
been enhanced by the adoption - following the attacks of September IV - of the Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001 (the Patriot Act).42 Until the adoption of the Patriot Act, the U.S.
anti-money laundering framework was mainly comprised 43 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code
Section 195644, Title 18 of the U.S. Code Section 195745 and the Bank Secrecy Act of
1970, as amended.46 This framework is extremely intricate and cannot possibly be
summarized here, but it remains narrower in scope than the European anti-money
laundering regulations, in that it imposes reporting and monitoring obligations mainly on
financial institutions and provides for limited mandatory disclosure requirements.
Significant attention has been devoted to the privacy implications of the Patriot Act as
well as to its territorial scope, but its purely anti-money laundering provisions are in fact
limited to financial institutions. It also makes "the act of smuggling cash itself a criminal
offense ' 7 , and allows "jurisdictions over launderers even where their conduct lacks a
sufficient United States connection where there is proper service of process. ' ,48 The
"tracking" of potentially criminal assets will be improved as well, with the new interagency Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center (FTAT) being able to use FinCEN data.
Meanwhile, the current U.S. administration has resolved to withdraw its
support for a multilateral solution to the issue of problematic OFCs. It appears to
Cf. International Monetary Fund. UnitedStates ofAmerica: Anti-Money LaunderingPractices,IMF
(Nov. 8, 2001), at http://www.imf.org/extemal/NP/mae/aml/2001/eng/110801.htm
42 Uniting and Strengthening America by providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
41

Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (the Patriot Act).
43 See Section XII, "Money Laundering", in: Helm, Robert W., "Creating, Managing and Distributing
Offshore Investment Products", Nuts & Bolts of Financial Products, Practicing Law Institute, 2002.
44 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956 (2001).
45 18 U.S.C.S. § 1957 (2001).
46 12 U.S.C.S. § 1829 (1994).
47 See supra,note 43.
48 Id.
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disapprove of the extension of disclosure requirements contemplated by the FATF and
finds that the FATF initiative serves as a tool to the OECD countries to deter
international tax competition. This ambiguous duality was indeed obvious at the time of
the creation of the FATF. 49 The results that the FATF has achieved as far as coercing
cooperation from certain problematic OFCs have consequently been shadowed by
concerns over whether it is in fact a Trojan horse assembled by the developed world to
fight OFCs' favorable tax regimes rather than international money laundering and
financial crime. The United States' new approach is thus helpful in that it highlights that
tax competition and money-laundering issues should not necessarily be confused.
Further, the conditional availability of the U.S. support is another reason, of paramount
importance, why the fight against money laundering will succeed only if it does not
appear to be a disguised attempt by the OECD countries to hinder tax competition.
Many observers, however, have been wondering whether the U.S. was in
fact entirely withdrawing its support for the FATF and whether the current U.S.
administration intends to repudiate all multilateral anti-money laundering initiatives. 50 In
response, Treasury Secretary O'Neill indicated that the U.S. acknowledgment of OFCs'
tax sovereignty must not be confused with leniency toward tax evasion or money
laundering. Since OFCs play a critical role in tax evasion (including U.S. tax evasion),
money laundering and financial crime, this distinction may seem rather subtle. In
addition, the anti-money laundering fight has been misportrayed by certain specialinterest groups as a European attempt to hamper U.S. competitiveness, deny OFCs'
sovereignty, build "a global network of tax police ' 51 , infringe on taxpayers' privacy
rights and even prevent the Caribbean economies from developing.
The adoption of the Patriot Act in the aftermath of the September 1 1 th
attacks, however, has demonstrated that the fights against international terrorism, crime
and money laundering are deeply entangled, and that financial opacity is beneficial first
and foremost to individuals and organizations engaging in illegal activities - not to the
populations of the Caribbean.

49

See, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, supra,note 16 (at 53-54).

50 So far the current U.S. administration seems to favor bilateral agreements on tax information exchange

between the United States and certain OFCs, such as those signed with the Bahamas on January, 25, 2002,
the Cayman Islands on November 27, 2001 and Antigua and Barbuda on December, 6, 2001.
51 Quote from House Republican leader Dick Armey; See on this issue INTERNATIONAL TAx SERVICE, Ernst
& Young, CHANGES IN U.S. POSITION CAUSES OECD To REFOCUS HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION PROJECT
(July 2001), at
htttp://www.ey.com/global/vault.nsf/Isle-of Man/Isle of ManOECDITSInsights/$file/E&Y%200EC
D%201TS.pdf
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B.

Acknowledging the benefits and shortcomings of the FATF approach.

In spite of the above-noted concerns over its ultimate purpose, the FATF
has been able to coerce certain OFCs into being cooperative and amending their legal
frameworks so as to deter money laundering and tax evasion. We think, however, that
the FATF endeavor will ultimately prove insufficient and that forceful retaliation against
certain problematic OFCs will be inevitable. Cooperation efforts should be pursued
further before any retaliation measures are taken, though, as they help identify which
OFCs are not sincerely dedicated to fighting money laundering.
The FATF succeeded in convincing certain OFCs to adopt anti-money
laundering regimes and allocate more resources to their law enforcement bodies. Yet we
believe that its method is bound to remain largely inefficient in terms of the fight against
money laundering and that it in fact highlights the pitfalls inherent in relying on good will
and self-improvement for the purpose of dealing with problematic OFCs.5 2 What the
FATF does in substance is to (i) identify the jurisdictions that do not have anti-money
laundering regulations and seem particularly vulnerable to it; (ii) issue recommendations
and guidelines and try to persuade these jurisdictions to adopt them; (iii) draft a "black
list" of the OFCs that fail to adopt these recommendations in a timely manner and
remove from the list those that have made substantial progress toward full compliance
with them 53 ; and (iv) take countermeasures against "non-cooperative" OFCs, mostly in
the form of regulations to be adopted by its members requiring their financial institutions
54
to pay extra attention or/and report any transactions conducted with these jurisdictions.
against
52

The FATF, however, lacks the capacity to take direct counter-measures
non-cooperative jurisdictions and therefore favors an incentives-based

The FATF is further impaired by its lack of operational resources in light of its enormous task. It relies

upon a five-persons team and an annual budget slightly in excess of U.S.$1 Million; Stem, Babette, Les
Huit Recommendations Du GAFI pour Lutter Contre le Financement Du Terrorisme, LE MONDE,
November 2, 2001 at 1.
3 "According to FATF:
Since the last progress report on NCCTs last October, the FATF confirms the countries have made
impressive progress towards improving their counter-money laundering regimes, which is reflected in
legislation that has been introduced into various parliamentary bodies as well as enacted legislation and
The organization's president, Josd Maria Roldfn, stated: "Our goal is for countries to deal
regulations ...
constructively with the gaps in their anti-money laundering systems. We do not want to keep them on the
list any longer than necessary. Close monitoring of the remaining legislative and implementation issues will
be crucial in determining an appropriate time for ajurisdiction's removal from the NCCT list."
Mandy Robinson, Says Worst Offending Tax Havens Must Remain On Money LaunderingBlacklist,
(February 5, 2001), at http://www.Tax-news.com/.
54 Those financial institutions must "pay special attention to any transaction having a link to a
country or
territory previously identified as non-cooperative" in order to make financial transactions more difficult
between unidentified individuals and institutions from non-cooperative OFCs and FATF members. See,
countermeasures against Nauru; at http://www 1.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/PR-20011205-en.pdf (at 1).
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approach. 55 This means that the FATF can only encourage OFCs to adopt anti-money
laundering regulations based upon its forty recommendations and must provide OFCs
with reasonable prospects of being taken off its list. 56 This has resulted in the Bahamas,
the Cayman Islands, Liechtenstein and Panama no longer being deemed "noncooperative" jurisdictions by the FATF after the FATF estimated that these jurisdictions
had satisfactorily adopted its recommendations. 5 7 In our view, these four jurisdictions
remain quite problematic in terms of international money laundering. Indeed, these
OFCs have adopted pieces of legislation and regulations consistent with the FATF forty
recommendations. Yet this might not make much of a difference for purposes of the fight
against money laundering. First, the FATF cannot monitor the implementation of these

laws and therefore relies on the goodwill and good faith of local authorities, which is
open to question. Second, the "black list" mechanism has an obvious perverse effect.
Adopting the aforementioned recommendations equals avoiding sanctions for the
concerned OFCs (or having sanctions lifted). Since the sanctions consist mostly of
vigilance and reporting requirements imposed on the financial institutions of the FAFT
member states, there is an obvious incentive for OFCs to adopt the FATF
recommendations so that foreign institutions are no longer required to monitor
transactions originating from or carried out with the OFCs. Third, the FATF 40
recommendations themselves do not contain sufficiently strong requirements regarding
the critical issue of corporate devices and regulatory loopholes, which allow5 8for investor
anonymity and, as noted above, directly permit and favor money laundering.
55 Additional

measures are being contemplated. See, Financial Action Task Force, Report on NonCooperative Countries and Territories (February 14, 2000), at
http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/NCCT-en.pdf (at 50):
FATF members could.., develop.., new type of countermeasures... should also consider whether it is
desirable and feasible to condition, restrict, target or even prohibit financial transactions with such
jurisdictions. Such measures could serve as an ultimate recourse should a country or a territory have
decided to preserve law or practices that are particularly damaging for the fight against money laundering
... also examine ways to prevent financial institutions located in identified non-cooperative countries or
territories from using facilities (for instance, information technology facilities) located in the FATF
members' territory. Id. at 54.
56 The FATF "encourage[s] constructive actions". "This dialogue should prompt them to adopt their laws
ideate 55.
and
57 change their practices". See
"Panama has achieved substantial progress towards putting in place a supervisory and regulatory
framework for the banking system that meets most international standards." It remains to be seen, however,
how local authorities uphold these standards. See STAFF ASSESSMENTS, International Monetary Fund,
PANAMA: OFFSHORE FINANCIAL ASSESSMENT, BANKING SECTOR ASSESSMENT (AUGUST 2001), at
http://www.imf.org/External/NP/ofca/2001/eng/pan/083101 .PDF
58 Like all multilateral endeavors, the FATF mechanism is also affected by political considerations. See
also, Russia's Money Laundering Charges, BBC News Online (16 July, 2001), at
http://www.bbcworldwide.com/.
In a G7 statement:
The issue is financial crime, and it is the Group of Seven (G7), the world's richest nations, who want Russia
to dance to its tune ... stakes are high, with Russia's potential entry into the World Trade Organization
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The determination of whether OFCs are truly "cooperative" should thus be
based upon whether or they not they agree to set up truly efficient and transparent
investor identification and record keeping tools. We have mentioned such problematic
practices as loose restrictions on the disposing and trading of negotiable bearer
instruments, but it might be opportune for cooperative OFCs to start by implementing
basic transparency enhancement procedures. First, identification mechanisms must be
unavoidable. Recent company law reforms have, for instance, enhanced corporate
transparency in Panama. Foreign investors, however, may still set up local foundations
through intermediaries and enjoy full anonymity. In addition, local records keeping
requirements are lax enough that the identity of foundations' beneficial owners may
remain unknown. While there will always be loopholes available to sophisticated and
well-advised criminals, it is possible to limit their scope significantly by requiring that no
legal entity may be established without its founders, shareholders, direct, indirect and
beneficial owners being identified in public records. Subsequent banking and financial
transactions must also become more traceable (for instance through enhanced
transparency of trading and clearing mechanisms). In addition, these records must be
available not only to local authorities but also to anyone seeking access to them, even
from abroad (as, for example, the German corporate registry is available to anyone
domestically as well as outside German borders).
This attests to the shortcomings of the FATF approach, which is likely to
prove insufficient once its "black list" is empty and that it appears that money laundering
has not been significantly impeded. The FATF's efforts should nonetheless be pursued
further, as a preliminary step toward taking more forceful measures against problematic,
non-cooperative OFCs. During this phase, the OECD countries - whether directly or
through the FATF - should request from all OFCs that they adopt requirements such as
those contemplated above with respect to investor identification, traceability of assets and
transparent corporate practices in exchange for "no tax harassment" commitments on the
part of the OECD countries. In order to make it very clear that the OECD countries'
focus is on deterring crime - as opposed to preventing international tax competition - the
OECD countries must formally acknowledge OFCs' tax sovereignty, which means
pledging not to challenge the tax practices of those of the OFCs that complete the
aforementioned anti-money laundering reforms. Such commitment may take the form of
formal acknowledgements within the frame of the WTO, the FATF or of multilateral
agreements, memoranda of understanding or "gentlemen's agreements" (e.g. between the
possibly at risk should it not put its house in order ... 'We will implement coordinated countermeasures
against [Russia] later this autumn if they have not enacted significant reforms by then, as recommended by
FATF'.
Still, US treasury secretary Paul O'Neill appears confident that Russia's response will be immediate:
"Money laundering in Russia is a closed issue, the question has been removed from the agenda." See id.
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E.U. Commission and a given OFC). Not only will this help identify truly "cooperative"
jurisdictions (that is, OFCs aspiring to attract international capital and assets through
attractive taxation rather than encouraging fraudulent financial activities and sheltering
criminally tainted assets), it will also serve a very important strategic purpose. Indeed,
the next step that the OECD countries should consider in order to thwart problematic
OFCs is to criminalize doing business and engaging in commercial and financial
activities with these OFCs - which may then attempt to retaliate with legal action. Those
forceful, repressive measures should be the second step of a two-step process designed to
better fight money laundering. Indeed, once the OECD countries have (a) taken
aggressive steps against money laundering domestically, (b) sought to cooperate and
work alongside OFCs against money laundering and crime and (c) made it apparent that
their intent is not to deter international tax competition and keep OFCs from adopting
competitive tax regimes, they will have effectively shielded themselves against most
possible legal actions by the criminalized OFCs.
C.
Going further: the case for a multilateral agreement on doing business
with problematic OFCs.
We believe that it would be opportune for the OECD countries to
eventually adopt a multilateral, binding agreement criminalizing doing business with the
OFCs that have failed to adopt transparency-enhancing measures and take appropriate
steps against crime, money laundering and doubtful business practice such as those
indicated above 59 (third party countries should be able to subscribe to the convention as
well). Criminalizing doing business with a problematic OFC should mean prohibiting
engaging in any transaction, whether commercial, financial or otherwise, with any person
or entity of which it might reasonably be assumed that it is located or incorporated in that
OFC or that its assets are located in that OFC. This acknowledges that FATF-type
solutions based upon OFCs' and financial organizations' self-discipline and goodwill are
flawed and do not permit it to effectively address the issues raised by problematic OFCs
- whose negative impacts are such that they call for more vigorous measures.
What, however, makes a multilateral agreement a more suitable
instrument for purposes of criminalization of certain OFCs than alternative, domestic
measures? A multilateral agreement appears to be most appropriate because it would (a)
follow the precedent set by the groundbreaking 1997 OECD convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials6 ° , whereby all parties committed to domestically
59

Desirable measures include, for instance, the setting up of transparent and publicly available corporate
registries, financial statements and records of corporate transactions, the adoption of devices allowing for
better traceability in connection with securities trading and clearing, strict rules governing negotiable bearer
instruments, better regulatory oversight of banking and financial activities and cooperation with other
nations in connection with the prosecution of money launderers and financial criminals.
60 15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd (1999).
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criminalize acts of bribery of foreign public officials and prosecute companies and
individuals suspected of having committed such acts, and (b) would permit to avoid the
traditional pitfalls of domestic laws aiming to address international issues (as discussed
below), such as the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996
(Helms-Burton Act)6 1 or the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) 62 in the
United States. Its binding nature would also logically make it a more effective tool than
non-binding recommendations.
There are, in fact, only four ways available to a jurisdiction to attempt to
tackle an international issue. The first is to adopt domestic laws of international reach,
the second is to adopt so-called "extraterritorial" laws, the third is to enter into a series of
bilateral agreements with foreign sovereigns and the fourth is to contribute to the
emergence of international standards (for instance through the adoption of multilateral
agreements). Considerable literature has been devoted to these issues, which go beyond
the scope of this article. The insufficiencies of national laws and frameworks designed to
address transnational issues are frequently noted, as well as the impracticalities of
concluding numerous bilateral agreements on a given issue. Domestic laws of
international reach include, for instance, the FCPA, which made it a federal crime for any
U.S. person or entity to bribe or offer to bribe a foreign official in order to obtain an
illegitimate business advantage. As for an example of a law that has been deemed
"extraterritorial" (rightfully, in this case), we think of the Helms-Burton Act. The FCPA
has been widely criticized by U.S. companies, which contended that it impaired their
ability to conduct business abroad while their foreign competitors did not bear equivalent
burdens63 (the above-mentioned Paris declaration might suffer from the same flaws as the
FCPA did in this regard, as it will place European companies at a disadvantage relative to
their U.S. competitors and lacks the participation of the E.U.'s biggest commercial
partner). Laws of extraterritorial nature such as the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 have
infuriated the U.S. commercial partners (and most noticeably the European Union), raised
substantial concerns over their validity under international law and enforceability and
frustrated U.S. companies. 64 As a result, negotiations were eventually conducted with the
22 U.S.C.S. § 6081 (1996).
15 U.S.C.S. § 78a (1977).
63 See Christopher F. Corr and Judd Lawler, Damned If You Do, DamnedIf You Don't? The OECD
61
62

Convention and the GlobalizationofAnti-Bribery Measures, 32 V AND J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1252 (November,
1999), at http://law.vanderbilt.edu/journal/32-5-2.html
64 Especially the U.S. companies with foreign competitors in the areas relevant to the Helms-Burton Act,
which felt that they would have to comply with the requirements of the law while their foreign counterparts
would (a) disregard the law if they had no substantial business interests in the United States and/or (b)
relentlessly challenge the law on the ground of its extraterritoriality if it were to apply to them - an
argument that was not equally available to U.S. companies. "The law ...
will have a negative impact for the
U.S. position in the global economy in several areas, including (1) conflict with the principles underlying
the WTO multilateral trading system; (2) possible violation of specific U.S. commitments in the WTO; (3)
creation of a bad precedent for future actions by other countries; and (4) undermining of respect and
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European Union and a settlement was reached so that E.U. companies be exempted from
the most controversial requirements of the Helms-Burton Act 65, while the United States
Congress responded to the claims of U.S. companies by significantly lowering their
obligations under the FCPA.66
In light of these or other examples, it appears that a binding, multilateral,
widely agreed upon and enforceable agreement is preferable to any available domestic
solutions. 67 All multilateral attempts, however, raise challenging consensus building
issues that constitute their most serious pitfalls. Countless draft multilateral agreements
ended up as non-binding recommendations or guidelines because they lacked widespread
support or understanding about their basic terms from the beginning. In addition, it must
be noted that purely domestic attempts such as the adoption of the FCPA by the United
States may be invaluable for international cooperation purposes. It is indeed the need for
a fair and internationally level playing field that led the United States to pressure its
fellow OECD members to adopt the above-noted 1997 convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials. 68 Faced with the prospect of either abandoning the FCPA (or
amending it enough to make it useless) or persuading its economic partners to subject
themselves to similar obligations, the U.S. supported the second option and played a
critical role in the adoption of the 1997 Convention. Had the original will to tackle
international bribery not originated from the U.S. and not been translated into a law there,
support for U.S. leadership in international economic relationships." See, H.R. Comm. on Int'l Relations,
Session, at pg. 3 of
Subcomm. on Int'l Econ. Policy and Trade, 143 Cong. Rec. D. 271, 1 0 5 th Cong., Ist
Comm. Report (on March 19, 1997) (statement of Dr. Ernest H. Preeg); See also CSIS Watch, The HelmsBurton Law, 173 CTR. STRG & INT'L ST. (1997), at http://www.csis.org/htm/7wtch 173.html.
65 Stefaan Smis and Kim Van der Borght, CurrentDevelopments: The EU-U.S. Compromise on the Helmsand D'Amato Acts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 227 (1999).
Burton
66
From a recent symposium:
The United States began the effort to achieve a legislative solution to extraterritorial bribery in 1977 with
Despite the strong support of the DOJ and [the] SEC, enforcement of the FCPA was minimal.
the FCPA ...
U.S. businesses secretly continued to bribe foreign government officials. Its passage signified the U.S.
government's unilateral stance against business corruption and resulted in prolonged, vehement objection
objection to the FCPA was that American companies doing business
by the U.S. business community ...
abroad were now placed in the untenable position of competing for contracts against other businesses that
were free of FCPA-like restrictions. Businesses applied pressure to members of Congress to repeal the
FCPA. Congress capitulated to some extent by amending the FCPA provisions to clarify the parameters of
amendments, contained in the 1988 Omnibus Trade and
conduct categorized as bribery. The ...
Competitiveness Trade Act, considerably reduced the strength of the harshest provisions of the FCPA but
increased penalties for other violations.
Barbara C. George and Kathleen A. Lacey, Symposium: FightingInternationalCorruption& Bribery In
the 21st Century, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 547 (2000).
67 Some observers have advocated the adoption of a comprehensive convention against international
organized crime. See CarrieLyn Donigan Guymon, InternationalLegal Mechanismsfor Combating
TransnationalOrganizedCrime: The Needfor a MultilateralConvention. 18 BERKELEY. J INT'L L., 53, Pg.
(2000)
68
See supra,note 60.
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it is fair to assume that an international agreement on bribery such as the 1997
Convention would still be a distant aspiration. A similar international agreement should
be reached in order to address an issue of the importance
of the fight against international
69
proceeds.
its
of
laundering
and
crime and the harboring
However, as opposed to mainly incentives-based FATF-type approaches, a
binding multilateral agreement relying on aggressive sanctions may expose its signatories
to legal retaliation by the concerned OFCs. Although the threat of sanctions is not per se
problematic from an international law standpoint, the actual use of such sanctions might
well be. 70 Under international law, though not under all international law doctrines,
sanctions are usually available to remedy a violation of a pre-defined international
obligation. As earlier indicated, persistently non-cooperative OFCs may be deemed to be
in violation of their obligation under international law to fight crime and the laundering
of its proceeds. Should this mean, however, that states are consequently entitled to bring
legal action and/or take counter-measures against these OFCs? The existence of an
international obligation is not sufficient to give rise to a claim under international law.
Rather, a cause of action will arise from the failure to perform, or the violation of, an
international obligation that results in legally recoverable damages. 71 The damage,
whether real of assumed, and the causal link between such damage and the violation of
the obligation are necessary elements to the existence of liability. Hence, the acts that, in
the view of the OECD, "may potentially cause harm to the tax systems of other countries
as they facilitate both corporate and individual income tax avoidance" 72 cannot as such
give rise to a claim under international law. Yet the international community arguably
suffers from international crime and money laundering, and OFCs' money launderingfriendly frameworks may be construed as directly contributing to the continuous
occurrence of this damage. By adopting the OECD convention, the signatories would
thus simply attempt to remedy the damage that they suffer from the OFCs' leniency
toward international crime and money laundering.
The issue, then, is whether these OFCs would be able to bring legal action
against the signatories to the convention on grounds such as that it in fact discriminates
against them, serves as a tool to unfairly exclude them from international trade, denies
69

In this regard, the aforementioned "Paris declaration" may constitute the first conclusive step toward

international criminalization of problematic OFCs.
Creating a list of non-compliant countries and threatening economic sanctions amount to pressure, which
does not constitute as such an illicit act under international law. It merely aims at creating the appropriate
climate for cooperation. See OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, PROGRESS IN
IDENTIFYING AND ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES, 2000, at
http://www 1.oecd.org/daf/fa/harm_tax/ReportEn.pdf (at 17).
71Case concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Spain v. Country), 2000 I.C.J.
(Feb. 5).
72
OECD, Harmful Tax Competition, supra note 16, at 23.
70
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their sovereign right to adopt the tax or legal regimes they see fit and/or is an
inappropriate remedy.
While it is impossible to foresee the outcome of such a procedure, one
may anticipate that they would not have a very strong case. Essentially, non-WTO OFCs
will only be able to rely on litigation before the jurisdictions of the OECD countries or to
bring actions before the ICJ, whereas WTO members will likely rely on the WTO dispute
resolution mechanism. 73 OFCs should be able to easily prove that the convention has
caused a prejudice to them before the ICJ or the OECD countries' domestic courts. But
they may have a much harder time establishing that the OECD countries did wrong in
making it illegal to conduct business with jurisdictions that have failed to adopt effective
anti-money laundering frameworks and enhanced transparency standards. The OECD
countries will likely make the case that theirs was a good faith effort, as evidenced by
their acknowledgement of the tax practices of the OFCs that have chosen cooperation on
the fight against laundering (which arguably was their obligation under customary
international law, as noted above).74 Furthermore, the OECD countries will assert that
the OFCs - by failing to adopt transparency-enhancing measures and comply with strict
anti-money laundering standards - have not clearly established their opposition to
illegitimate business activities and that one's right to conduct illegitimate activities must
not be upheld.75
Things might be less clear-cut as far as litigation within the frame of the
WTO, but there are good reasons to think that the OFCs will end up on the losing side as
well.76 Firstly, OFCs will claim that the convention's signatories have violated their
trade obligations. These obligations, however, are not absolute. Under the Security
Exceptions of GATT and GATS, any WTO member is entitled to take any action "which
it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests". 77 Taking the
necessary means to protect oneself against international crime may be construed as
essential to one's security interests, whether economic and financial - or even military in
light of terrorists' reliance on financial crime to accumulate resources. In broader terms,
commercial obligations yield to international public order. In addition, WTO members
have known since the WTO Appellate Body decision "United States - Import Prohibition

73For an

assessment of this mechanism, see Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasuresin the
WTO: Rules Are Rules-Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 335 (2000).
74 See discussion, supra,Part I.B.3.
75Ability to conduct legitimate business/financial activities with OFCs is rightfully not "put in question" by

the FATF. See Report on Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories, supra,note 55, at 55.

It is worth mentioning that Saint Kitts & Nevis is a WTO member.
XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and Article XIV(b)(I)(s) of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
76

77 Article
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of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products" (Shrimp/Turtle) 78 that they have the right under
WTO rules to "take unilateral trade action" 79 against certain states, provided they have
previously attempted to engage in multilateral negotiations80 and that they do so on the
ground of exceptions to which they are legally entitled. The decision grants them such
right in connection with the application of Article XX (General Exceptions) and
considers that unilateral trade sanctions may be utilized under certain circumstances to
achieve certain goals of environment protection and sustainable growth. There is no
compelling reason why this rationale should not apply in connection with Article XXI,
In essence, carefully
which provides for the aforementioned Security Exceptions.
81
designed unilateral trade measures are no longer invalid per se.
Secondly, OFCs might claim that a convention criminalizing doing
business with them is an inappropriate remedy on the part of the OECD countries, the
argument being that there is no immediate connection between the damage (the
continuous occurrence of crime) and the remedy taken (the complete prohibition of any
activity whatsoever carried out with a given jurisdiction). However, the OECD countries
may argue that (i) no other effective remedy is available and that it is the concerned
OFC's failure to forcefully address the issue of money laundering that ineluctably led to
such remedy after the OECD countries had "exhausted all options reasonably available"
to it 82 , and that (ii) this measure was "necessary'

83,

as its anti-money laundering goal

"could not be accomplished in a manner that was less trade restrictive". 84

Criminalized OFCs might also argue that the convention's adoption
amounts to "discriminatory" sanctions. The WTO has constantly upheld the principle of
non-discrimination in trade sanctions and the Shrimp/Turtle case confirmed it
unambiguously. These OFCs may therefore be expected to make the point that by
78Report

of the WTO Appellate Body on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Srimp and Shrimp
WT/DS58/AB/R, October 12, 1998, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/58abr.pdf
Products,
79
See Raj Bhala, HegelianReflections on UnilateralAction in the World Trading System. 15 BERKELEY J.
INT'L
LAW 159 (1997).
80
"The United States has sought to impose a unilaterally determined conservation measure through
restrictions on trade, and has not explored the scope for working cooperatively with other countries to
identify internationally shared concerns about sea turtle conservation issues and consider ways to address
these concerns." See, supra,note 78, at 54.
81See Benjamin Simmons, In Search of Balance: An Analysis of the WTO Shrimp/Turtle
Appellate Body Report, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 413 (1999); See also Joseph Robert Berger, Unilateral
Trade Measures to Conserve the World's Living Resources: An EnvironmentalBreakthroughfor the GA TT
in the WTO Sea Turtle Case, COLUM. J.ENVTL. L., 355 (1999).
82 See Benjamin Simmons, supra, note 81, at 8540-436.
83
See Article XX (General Exceptions) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) providing
that such exceptional measures are "subject to the requirement that [they] are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade." Supra, note 77.
84 See Simmons, supra, note 81, at 8540-436.
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criminalizing doing business with them while not acting alike toward territories such as
Guernsey or Luxembourg, the OECD countries have both discriminated against them and
promoted their affiliated territories at the OFCs' expense. This appears to be a valid
argument. It is thus another reason why the OECD countries must have made their best
efforts to address the issue of money laundering domestically by the time of the
convention's adoption. In any case, if the WTO were to rule against the OECD countries
in this matter, it is rather unclear which means would be available to those OFCs to
remedy the harm done by the convention's adoption. This, however, relates to the more
general, but critical, issue of whether small nations are able to effectively retaliate against
the developed world within the current frame of the WTO. 85
Conclusion
Money laundering and financial crime are issues of paramount importance
to both the developed and developing worlds, which call for forceful measures and
international cooperation. International approaches to this issue are thus justified,
although past attempts have not been free of ambiguity and have been only partially
effective. To ensure greater efficiency, organizations such as the OECD must provide
guarantees that their focus is on thwarting international crime rather than impeding tax
competition. The credibility of any action against money-laundering imposed by
international law is greatly undermined by the inclusion of measures aimed at limiting
international tax competition. Further, favorable tax regimes may co-exist with actions
against money laundering and financial crime, and the OECD countries' interest is to
acknowledge the tax practices of the OFCs while effectively working toward deterring
This entails adopting comprehensive transparency-enhancing
money laundering.
measures, as well as abandoning various regulatory and corporate devices allowing for
investors' anonymity and the non-traceability of assets.
In addition, problematic, persistently non-cooperative OFCs may and
should be deemed to be violating their obligations under international law with respect to
fighting crime. These OFCs contribute to the occurrence of a continuous damage that the
OECD countries should consider remedying. This raises a number of challenging
international trade issues relating to the means available to the OECD countries to strike
these jurisdictions, and the possibility that they may retaliate with legal action either
before the WTO or outside its frame.
Thwarting financial crime and its corollary, money laundering, is not easy
but nonetheless feasible. It is essentially, and unsurprisingly, a matter of political will.
Commitment to tackling this issue, along with sustained effort, will undoubtedly prove
85

See Pauwelyn, supra,note 73.
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fruitful. It is no less of a challenge than fighting international bribery, which led to the
adoption of the 1997 OECD convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials and similar agreements or legislative instruments throughout the world.
Apart from their criminal nature, bribery and money-laundering distort
international trade and, as such, the existence of appropriate national legislation should
become a criterion for admission and continuous membership to the WTO. Currently,
countries must adjust their foreign trade legal regimes to the WTO standards in order to
be granted admission, yet they do not have to meet even minimal standards with respect
to money laundering and financial crime. This situation demands change. It also
connects to the broader topic of whether adequate levels of human rights, labor standards
an so forth should be achieved in order to gain admission to the WTO.
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